Nothing is Free (Introduction)
The concept of state legislative professionalization began through a reformist movement in the 1960s. Increasing professionalization, which refers to the institution and not individual members, was seen as a way to diversify state legislatures through better pay, which would, in theory, make legislative service a financially viable option for more people. (CCSL, 1971) Although this argument took hold and states began increasing pay, hiring more staff, and increasing session length, the diversity never arrived. (Rosenthal, 1989) Through multiple studies, there is little evidence that professionalization has increased diversity in state legislatures, with some even suggesting the movement has been a detriment to diversity. (Carnes & Hansen, 2016; Hansen & Clark, 2020; Squire, 1992) Explanations offered for this lack of increased diversity point to the increased benefits associated with professionalized legislatures crowding out economically diverse candidates, more competition, and more expensive elections. (Carnes & Hansen, 2016; Moncrief, 1992; Squire, 2000; Thompson & Moncrief, 1998) The increased need to fundraise, brought on by the benefits to service in professionalized legislatures may be preventing candidates of diverse economic backgrounds from winning elections. While these studies point to possible explanations, none combine these various theories to ask if the time associated with campaigning and fundraising for state legislative seats is a barrier to entry preventing more diverse membership.
Money is Power (Literature Review)
Over the past half-century, as state legislatures have become increasingly professionalized, the employment of these measures in the research of these bodies has become increasingly common. The early deployment of professionalization measurements used ideal notions to evaluate individual states against. (Grumm, 1971) This means that the measure of professionalization was based on an arbitrary standard. The field of state legislative professionalization changed when Squire (1992) introduced what has become known as the Squire index. He based his index on the notion that the United States Congress was an ideal legislative body. Taking relevant data, such as congressional member pay, the average number of staffers per member, and the number of days in session, a baseline was created to compare state legislatures to. This index has since become the dominant measurement in state legislative professionalism literature, with periodic updates provided for the benefit of the field. (Squire, 1992, 1997, 2000, 2007, 2012, 2017) Some have called out the Squire index for being one-dimensional and an over-simplification of professionalism. (Bowen & Greene, 2014) They argue that professionalism is more heterogeneous than the Squire index allows for; states professionalize in differing ways and a multidimensional approach to professionalization indexing could provide a more robust view of professionalization. (Bowen & Greene, 2014) Using a multidimensional index, they argue would provide the field with a clearer understanding of state legislative professionalism and how it develops. (Bowen & Greene, 2014) However, this mischaracterizes the purpose of the Squire index, which measures the current level of professionalization of a state legislature, a crucially different phenomenon than professionalizing. (Squire, 1997) In the field of state legislative scholarship, professionalization measures, like the Squire index, had been seen as a practical tool used to compare how state legislatures operate and who serves in them.
The paper that introduced the Squire index focused on the diversification, including gender, racial, and occupational diversity, of state legislatures through the process of professionalization. (Squire, 1992) Despite the promise of greater diversity with professionalization, there was little evidence that greater diversity was achieved through professionalization. This finding was explained away by the existence of complex societal forces, which were not examined further. Since the work of increasing diversity in elective office is so complex, it has been a point of emphasis for scholars. Hansen and Clark (2020) chose to investigate the diversity of leadership positions within state legislative bodies. Their study focused on the ascendancy of underrepresented lawmakers into legislative leadership positions and again found that professionalization has no significant effects on increasing diversity, even for members who are already in office. Their analysis even pointed toward negative effects for Black, Latino, and blue-collar members, although not at a statistically significant level. (Hansen & Clark, 2020) In an effort to find explanations for the discrepancy between the promise of professionalization to increase diversity and the analysis that says otherwise, scholars have turned to the electoral process. Professionalized legislatures have not made much progress in attracting working-class candidates at a higher rate than less professionalized legislatures, and may actually be crowding them out with wealthier candidates. (Carnes & Hansen, 2016) This crowd-out effect might be due to the benefits of serving in a professionalized legislature.
One of the hallmarks of serving in a professionalized state legislature in the increased pay and benefits, making legislator compensation more competitive to outside employment and careers (Squire, 1992) This competitive compensation allows legislative pay to better meet the financial needs of most people serving in these bodies. This reduces the opportunity cost of legislative service, by reducing the need for outside careers to maintain financial stability. (Maddox, 2004b) As a result of these decreased opportunity costs and competitive compensation, service in professionalized state legislatures is seen as more attractive for those in already lucrative careers. (Besley, 2004; Besley & Coate, 1997; Osborne & Slivinski, 1996) The increase of wealthier candidates, leading to a crowd-out of working-class candidates, has also put increased pressure on campaign fundraising. (Carnes & Hansen, 2016) The price of a seat was introduced as a concept to explain the need for candidates to increase fundraising throughout campaign cycles. (Moncrief, 1992) Professionalization has had a significant impact on the levels of campaign fundraising in state legislative elections. More professionalized state legislatures garner higher costs per seat, largely because of the draw of competitive compensation previously mentioned. (Thompson & Moncrief, 1998) This increase in fundraising levels seems to benefit incumbents significantly more than challengers or contenders in open-seat elections, heightening the importance of gaining a seat in a professionalized legislature. (R. Hogan, 2000) By offering competitive compensation, professionalized legislatures are an attractive option to those considering public service or advancing their careers in public service.
The measurement of state legislative professionalization has been an important development for the field of comparative American politics. The advancement of indexes in the measurement of professionalization, started by the Squire index, has allowed for a new understanding of how state legislatures operate and who serves in these bodies. The creation of the Squire index, the dominant professionalization index, was to examine diversity among legislators. Subsequent research has repeatedly found that women, racial minorities, and the working class have not achieved greater access to state legislatures because of professionalization. The increased pay associated with professionalization has attracted more privileged candidates, crowding out other candidates. Professionalization has increased the cost of a legislative seat by necessitating more campaign fundraising to win elections. The lack of increased diversity associated with legislative professionalization has been examined from a number of angles, including candidate choice and campaign fundraising, but there has been no research dedicated to the time demands of campaigning and fundraising associated with electoral success in professionalized state legislatures.
Money Often Costs Too Much (Theory)
The introduction of the squire index has advanced the field of state legislative research by providing a tool used for comparison between the fifty states and their ninety-nine legislative bodies. The measurement of professionalization has led to a wide variety of new research into the functioning of state legislatures and those who serve in those bodies. The level of professionalization of a state legislature has been shown to affect those who serve as state legislators. Those who are retirees, students, or homemakers are more likely to serve in less professionalized state legislatures. (Squire, 1992) While this is important research which broadens our understanding of who is voting on legislation in each state, it is also important to look at what effects does professionalization has on elections. Specifically, what effect does the level of professionalization for state legislatures have on the time demands necessary to earn a legislative seat?
The variation in professionalization across state legislatures is not only a measure of the institution but also a measure of the legislators themselves. Professionalized state legislatures can incentivize service in ways that less professionalized legislatures cannot. Due to the lower pay, state legislators in less professionalized bodies are more likely to have outside careers to supplement their service in state government, but those serving in more professionalized legislatures with higher salaries are less likely to have outside careers to supplement their service. (Maddox, 2004b) The negative effect on outside careers by legislative professionalism is also shaped by the number of days legislatures are in session. Legislative bodies are shaped by the members who serve in them; longer or unlimited sessions are created because legislators place an emphasis on the work of legislative service as opposed to maintaining outside careers. (Maddox, 2004a) The increased level of pay in professionalized legislatures allows members to spend more time focused on the work of legislating.
Time in session, another component of the squire index, could serve as a major draw towards service in a state legislature. Not only are more days in session associated with higher professionalization, but it also allows for more legislation to be introduced and voted on. For legislators in more professionalized state legislatures, especially those in the majority party, there is a significantly higher success rate of legislative proposals. (Francis, 1985) To put it another way, serving in a more professionalized state legislature gives legislators a better chance at seeing the advancement of their policy proposals advanced. Less professionalized legislatures, which often have mandated limits to the number of days they have in session, face a time crunch to get legislation introduced and passed. (Rosenthal, 1998) This time crunch causes legislative prioritization to occur and a mad dash to get the most important bills through before they are wiped away by the deadline. (Rosenthal, 1998) Those who serve in professionalized legislatures tend to devote themselves to the legislative process more, with the extra time in session allowing for mastery and the opportunity to create passable legislation. (Ehrenhalt, 1992) The operating goal of a legislator is to create and pass legislation. Serving in a more professionalized legislature provides a greater opportunity for legislators to have an impact on the legislative process and get their policy proposals passed.
Professionalized state legislatures are characterized by members who are devoted to legislative service and are interested in advancing their policy proposals. This increased ability to play a role in the policy-making process is crucial for members who wish to run for higher office. (Squire, 1988) These legislators believe that demonstrating policymaking skills in the statehouse will show voters that they can be effective lawmakers. To ensure they can display these skills to voters, candidates running for higher office want to ensure a fundraising base. When members of more professionalized state legislatures run for Congress, they tend to benefit from more funding and support from Political Action Committees (PACs) as they kick off their campaign; this is because they are able to build relationships with PAC lobbyists while serving as state legislators. (Berkman & Eisenstein, 1999) These relationships with PACs serve as important launching points for congressional campaigns, helping them get an early fundraising advantage.
Professionalized state legislatures offer several benefits including, competitive pay, which provides financial stability and reduces the need to rely on outside employment; more days in session, which provides legislators with more opportunities to get their policies passed; and greater opportunity to move on to higher office. Better pay, inclusion in the legislative process, and the opportunity to move onto higher office provide strong incentives for candidates to run for office in professionalized state legislatures. While state legislative elections are often characterized by the large numbers of uncontested races, professionalized legislatures attract more candidates, reducing the number of uncontested elections. (Squire, 2000) Attracted by the incentives that service in a professionalized legislature provides, candidates need to place an emphasis on campaign fundraising. Since state legislative elections receive less media attention than statewide or federal races, campaign fundraising levels play an outsized role in election results. (Gierzynski & Breaux, 1991) In these elections, the amount a campaign spends plays a significant role in election outcomes, this is especially true for candidates challenging incumbents, although incumbent or open-seat candidates tend to be better funded. (Gierzynski & Breaux, 1991) The increased need to fundraise means that legislators need to dedicate more time to campaign activities on top of their other responsibilities; even legislators considered part-time report the work of staying in office, including fundraising, takes the hours of a full-time job. (Kurtz et al., 2006) The nature of work in professionalized legislatures seems to benefit incumbent candidates. As already established, professionalized legislatures are considered more policy-focused bodies; incumbent legislators have cultivated relationships with interest groups and PAC representatives and benefit from their support during the campaign season. (R. Hogan, 2000) Possibly because of this baked-in relationship with interest groups, incumbents in professionalized legislatures have a significant electoral advantage. (Carey et al., 2000) This advantage could also be attributed to challenger struggles to keep pace with incumbent fundraising efforts. (R. E. Hogan, 2004) Despite the strong advantage incumbent candidates hold in campaign fundraising, challenger and open-seat candidates have strong incentives to push for every campaign contribution. This is because in state legislative elections campaign fundraising has an outside role in electoral success.
Incentives such as higher pay, a greater ability to advance legislative proposals, and more opportunity to advance to higher office make a seat in a professionalized state legislature more valuable than a seat in a less professionalized legislature. The incentives offered by professionalized legislatures draws more candidates, reducing the number of uncontested elections. Contested elections create a focus on campaign fundraising. Although incumbents have a significant fundraising advantage, challenger and open-seat candidates have strong incentives to boost their campaign war chests. The combination of an increased number of contested elections and the importance of campaign fundraising in state legislative elections will increase the pressure for candidates of all types to dedicate a significant amount of campaign time to fundraising efforts as professionalization levels increase. When challenger candidates can match the war chests of their incumbent opponents, they are often successful, that is why I believe that in contested elections, contests within a 10-point margin of victory, challenger candidates will dedicate more time fundraising than incumbents. The field of campaign fundraising has discovered that the increased incentives of professionalized legislatures have significant implications for the entry of candidates and their behavior during campaigns, but no studies have been dedicated to the time candidates dedicate to their campaign because of professionalization. This study intends to fill the gap in this important field of research.
H1: Increased state legislature professionalization will increase the amount of time candidates spend fundraising.
H2: Challenger candidates in competitive elections spend more time fundraising than incumbent candidates.
Worth Their Weight in Gold (Research Design)
In this study, the primary dependent variable will be time spent fundraising. Time spent fundraising will include all fundraising activity, including phone calls, endorsement meetings, fundraising events, and virtual fundraising communications. The independent variables in this study will be the level of legislative professionalization and candidate type. The level of legislative professionalization will be measured utilizing the most recent Squire index update available. (Squire, 2017) Candidate type measures if a candidate is an incumbent, challenger, or competing for an open seat. To measure the interplay between the dependent and independent variables a survey will be conducted among the 533 state legislators that serve in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Tennessee. A survey has been determined to be the best methodology to utilize in this study because it is the most efficient way to obtain a large-n data set. Utilizing survey methodology to collect data on state legislators works because state legislators are largely willing participants in responding to academic surveys. (Maestas et al., 2003) This study will utilize a paper survey mailed to all 533 state legislators. Despite the added time and costs associated with mail surveys, they receive a significantly higher response rate compared to internet-based surveys. (Fisher & Herrick, 2013)
The questions in this survey will focus on each legislator’s fundraising and campaign activities in their most recent election. Establishing questions will ask if they ran in their last election as an incumbent, challenger, or an open-seat candidate. They will also be asked what district they won election in, as well as demographic information. The primary data collection questions in this survey will focus on legislators’ perceptions of fundraising activity, percent of campaign time dedicated to fundraising, estimates of time spent fundraising, and how much time candidates work on campaign-related activities.
Case selection for this study was based on three factors, professionalization level, population size, and campaign finance laws. These states were selected as comparative samples of the highest (1-10), middle (20-30), and lowest (41-50) tiers of legislative professionalization (MA 2, MN 25, TN 44). (Squire, 2017) These states all feature similar population sizes (MA 7.03M, MN 5.7M, TN 6.91M). (U.S. Census Redistricting Data, 2020). They also have similar campaign contribution restrictions, particularly for individual campaign contribution limits. (NCSL, 2019) Selecting states that have similar campaign finance laws is an important control for internal validity because stricter campaign finance laws have led to greater levels of challenger emergence in state legislative elections. (Hamm & Hogan, 2008) I believe that based on previous literature my methodological approach will produce a valuable and unique dataset, which will open a new avenue of state legislative research.
Money Isn’t Everything, But Having It Is (Conclusion)
In this study, I intend to uncover the amount of time successful state legislative candidates are putting into fundraising efforts during their campaigns. This is to help uncover the lack of increased diversity associated with professionalized state legislatures. This lack of increased diversity has been explained because professionalized state legislative seats are coveted by those seeking electoral office. Since they are seen as coveted seats, elections for professionalized legislatures cost more, meaning theoretically candidates would have to spend more time campaigning. I expect that candidates running for seats in professionalized legislatures will dedicate more time to fundraising as a function of campaigning than those running in less professionalized legislatures. Since incumbents have a significant electoral advantage, I expect them to spend less time fundraising than challenger or open-seat candidates. There is an abundance of research dedicated to the cost of running for office in the United States, but little on the time candidates must dedicate to their campaigns win election in state legislative races. Those in working-class jobs typically have less flexibility in their schedules, making campaigning a larger burden. Investigating this potential barrier to legislative service will help find solutions to make state legislatures more accessible and membership more representative.
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Max Seeley 